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Abstract
The European Union rights discourse is dominated by talk of individual, and not group,
rights. Individual market actors are the constitutive atoms of European Union law.
Within this legal framework, the onus has been on the Member States to protect and
contribute to minority language groups. This paper examines some of the ways Member
States accommodate and recognize the minority language groups residing within Europe,
and subsequently analyzes the compatibility of these measures with the EC Treaty in
light of the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) willingness to invoke the Treaty in an
increasing array of situations. Specifically, the article argues that the expansive view of
EU citizenship taken by the ECJ in the Martinez Sala case (confirmed judicially by
subsequent cases and legislatively by important directives) increases the range of
situations for which the EU’s non-discrimination principle may invalidate these Member
State group rights measures. The ECJ's willingness to interpret citizenship expansively is
troubling because it has not taken a similar expansive interpretation of the concept of
minority group rights. After discussing the theoretical background and practical
importance of the distinction between individual rights and group rights, this article
discusses the key ECJ cases involving the conflict of group language rights and
individual Community rights. Ultimately, the paper concludes by recommending (1) the
ECJ adopt a new interpretive approach to analyzing Member States’ bona fide efforts to
protect minority language groups; or (2) the Member States modify the EC Treaty in one
of three ways to permit group rights in the field of minority language protection without
running afoul of the individual rights of EU citizens embodied in the non-discrimination
principle.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) is a supranational entity comprised of twenty-five
member states, and vests rights with the individuals that are citizens of those Member
States. However, Europe as a cultural space consists of many more constitutive groups
that are currently left out of the structural legal framework of European integration.
Minority language groups, in particular, have been the subject of efforts by Member
States to protect and preserve linguistic diversity within their borders. The extent and
variety of solutions employed by Member States to protect their resident autochthonous
languages testifies to the importance of accommodating minority languages into the
European legal landscape.
The thesis of this paper is that the European Court of Justice’s1 jurisprudence puts
the legality of these measures in jeopardy, and that in order to ensure the continued
vitality of minority languages within the Member States, it may be necessary to formulate
new protective strategies to replace some of the old methods whose compatibility with
the Treaties is, by now, dubious. This paper will be divided into three parts that aim:

1

(1)

to provide a brief overview of the legal structures Member
States have erected to protect the linguistic and cultural
diversity within their borders, as well as the efforts made by
the various EU institutions to do the same;

(2)

to elaborate a theoretical and practical distinction between
group rights and individual rights; and characterize the
process of European economic and social/political
integration, in contrast to the approach taken by the Member
States, as fundamentally centered on individual, and not
group, rights—an approach which is inadequate to protect
minority languages; and

Hereinafter “ECJ.”
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to examine the salient ECJ cases in this field in the light of
the group rights/individual rights distinction, and analyze
their effect on efforts to protect and preserve minority
languages and cultures.

In conclusion I will recommend an interpretive strategy that would permit the ECJ to
consider group rights for minority languages as a sui generis subject of EU law and
thereby minimize the risk that bona fide group-protective measures will run afoul of the
non-discrimination principle contained in EC Treaty Article 12. That failing, I argue
further that minority groups and Member States should refocus their political efforts to
address minority language concerns in the EC Treaty itself, since the expanded notion of
EU citizenship and the ECJ’s willingness to invoke the EC Treaty’s non-discrimination
principle in new contexts have placed many Member State efforts to create minority
language group rights in potential conflict with the EC Treaty.

II.

LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT OF LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY IN THE
MEMBER STATES AND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
It is estimated that one out of every eight citizens of the European Union speaks a

minority language.2 Keeping in mind that the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 included the
first and only treaty reference to minority populations,3 it is hardly surprising that the
Member States have addressed the issue of minorities independently of the EU. The
Member States’ attempts at accommodating minorities have taken on different forms, and
have achieved varying success. Since the legal treatment of minorities (and minority
languages in particular) has been guided primarily by the Member States, any study of
2

Francesco Palermo, The Use of Minority Languages: Recent Developments in EC Law
and Judgments of the ECJ, 8 MAASTRICHT J. EURO. & COMP. L. 299 (2001).
3

Id. at 300.
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minority rights must begin there, before proceeding to the EU’s—and the ECJ’s—
treatment of the issue. In other words, in order to know how European integration affects
minority rights, it is essential to analyze the current domestic protections for these
groups, and how these legal protections may conflict with the Treaties.
Five modes of addressing minorities in Member State law are most prevalent:4
first, formal constitutional recognition of multiple official languages; second,
constitutional incorporation of protection for linguistic minorities; third, establishing
autonomous zones or communities with special language rights; fourth, central legislative
accommodation and recognition; and fifth, permitting small scale, informal local
measures designed to accommodate minority languages. Most Member States employ
hybrid forms of protection of their minority cultures and languages, making use of
multiple protective strategies. What follows is a representative sample of strategies
utilized by various Member States to incorporate linguistic minority protection.
A.

FORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION OF MULTIPLE OFFICIAL
LANGUAGES

When a minority language achieves official status, it obtains a unique legal status
within the state.5 Often, citizens may invoke a right to utilize the minority language in

4

The division into five categories is rough and by no means complete. Nearly all Member
States make use of several protective legal measures. The division into five serves only to
highlight some of the more prominent legal structures.
5

An example from the United States is the Hawaiian Constitution, which provides that
“English and Hawaiian shall be the official languages of Hawaii . . . .” HAW. CONST. art. XV, §
4. However, Hawaiian “shall be required for public acts and transactions only as provided by
law.” Id. The state legislature has ruled out mandatory use of Hawaiian, enacting a statute that
succinctly states, “Hawaiian shall not be required for public acts and transactions.” HAW. REV.
STAT. § 1-13 (Michie 2005). In addition, the legislature has enacted a sort of supremacy
provision that gives binding effect to the English version of a law, “[w]henever there is found to
exist any radical and irreconcilable difference.” Id. The jurisprudence addressing article XV,
section four has interpreted the provision restrictively, and courts, as a general matter, do not
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any official capacity. Official documents must often be provided in the official minority
language as well. The most obvious case of formal constitutional recognition is Ireland.
Ireland’s Constitution declares that the Irish language (Gaeilge, in Irish) is the “first
official language” of Ireland, though it technically a minority language, and less
frequently used than English—the “second” official language.6 Finland is another
example, where the Swedish-speaking minority is protected by the official status of
Swedish in Finland.7
Through a unique constitutional apparatus, the Belgian Constitution impliedly
recognizes three official languages. Belgium can be divided into three ethno-linguistic
groupings, with a Flemish-speaking majority (about 60 percent), a sizable francophone
minority (about 39 percent) and a small but significant regionally concentrated Germanspeaking population (about one percent).8 Article 2 of the Belgian Constitution divides
Belgium into three linguistic “Communities”: a German-speaking Community, a
Flemish-speaking Community, and a French-speaking Community. In addition, Article 3

seem to be too apt to read implied rights to invoke Hawaiian language rights where such rights
are not necessary. See, e.g., Tagupa v. Odo, 843 F.Supp 630, 631 (D. Haw. 1994) (upholding a
magistrate judge’s grant of a protective order denying a deponent the “right” to conduct a
deposition in Hawaiian despite deponent’s fluency in English).
6

Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 8, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/static/256.pdf
(last visited February 16, 2006). Interestingly, Ireland was the only signatory to the treaties that
did not require that its national and official language should be a working language at the
Community level. See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Impact of European Law on Linguistic
Diversity, 5 IRISH J. EURO. L. 63, 69 (1996); but see infra note 67.
7

The Finnish Constitution establishes both Finnish and Swedish as national languages.
See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] art. 17 (Finland), available at http://www.om.fi/
uploads/54begu60narbnv_1.pdf (last visited February 16, 2006).
8

See Languages of Belgium, in SIL INT’L, ETHNOLOGUE: LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD
(Raymond G. Gordon Jr., ed. 2005), available at http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country
.asp?name=BE (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
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provides that Belgium is comprised of three regions: the Walloon region, the Flemish
region, and the Brussels region.9 Roughly speaking, the francophone Community resides
in Walloon, along with the German-speaking minority. Brussels is split between Flemish
and French speakers. Each Community elects a Community Council to act on its
behalf.10 The constitution lays out a complicated scheme of government that grants to the
linguistic communities varying degrees of autonomy over core cultural competences
including education, cultural policy, and inter-Community cooperation. A sort of
minority veto exists as well. The Communities are grouped in the federal parliament
such that if three-quarters of a linguistic group believe a proposed law threatens to
“gravely damage” inter-Community relations, the dissenting group may halt the
legislative process and initiate a set of special review procedures.11 The regional
governments are elected by the Community Councils12 and their powers are derived from
devolutions from the federal government.13
Notably, and unlike the Finnish and Irish examples, Belgium’s federal constitution
does not recognize any official languages per se,14 but instead attempts to map its

9

The Belgian Constitution also creates four “linguistic regions” including the three spoken
languages and the bilingual Brussels area. See BELG. CONST., art. 4. This division is more
symbolic than of juridical consequence, where the regional and community groupings emerge as
more relevant.
10

See id., arts. 115-21.

11

See id., art 54; see also Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in
Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 551-52 (1991).
12

See BELG. CONST., art. 122.

13

See id., art. 39.

14

The regions, by contrast, do have official languages. The official language of the
Flemish Region is Dutch. The official languages of the Walloon Region are Dutch and French.
The Brussels Region is also officially bilingual.
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constitutional system onto an already-existing linguistic situation. The regions and
Communities themselves must determine, by way of procedures outlined in the federal
constitution, the trajectory of their own linguistic policy. To use the popular legal binary,
Belgium is concerned primarily with granting procedural rights to linguistic groups, and
eschews substantive rights at the federal level. Though German is an “implied” official
language, rights to use German are limited in scope geographically; it is officially
recognized in only nine municipalities in the province of Eupen and Saint Vith.15 Thus,
though the Constitution recognizes the German-speaking minority and incorporates it into
the constitutional order, on the ground German speakers can rely on limited regional
rights. The constitution thus divides Belgium’s geographic space according to the
languages spoken in those regions. The Belgian Constitution presupposes an interaction
between minority language groups and the majority Flemish Community on the federal
and regional levels.
B.

CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO PROTECT MINORITIES

A state’s constitution may mandate that the state take certain action to protect the
diversity contained within its borders. In such an arrangement, the linguistic policy is
distributed, pursuant to the constitutional mandate, top-down from the central
government instead of horizontally from a sub-state entity. Italy is the Member State
wherein the largest number of minority populations reside.16 Article 6 charges the Italian

15

16

Id.

An estimated 2.5 million people belong to at least 12 minority groups within Italy.
Francesco Palermo, The Italian Draft Bill on Linguistic Minorities, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN
EUROPE 55 (Snezana Trifunovska, ed. 2001).
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Republic with “protecting linguistic minorities with appropriate norms.”17 Nevertheless,
and in part due to the protections already in place from the regions system,18 the Italian
Parliament only passed general protective legislation pursuant to its Article 6 powers in
1999—51 years after the Constitution entered into force.
The 1999 law protects the language and culture of the Albanian, Catalán, German,
Greek, Slovene and Croat populations, as well as those speaking French Provençal,
Friulan, Ladin, Occitan, and Sardinian. Of particular note is the categorization of
minority group rights. Parliament singled out groups19 in need (or deserving, in the eyes
of some of the right-leaning political parties20) of protection, rather than establishing
minimum guarantees generally applicable to all individual citizens. Of course, such
treatment may be inevitable for effective protection mandated by Article 6, but it also
underscores the gravamen of that constitutional mandate: to protect linguistic and cultural
minorities means to protect designated groups of citizens.

17

COSTITUZIONE [COST.], art. 6 (translation is mine). The centrality of this article is
emphasized by its location after articles 4 and 5 (guaranteeing the right to work and respecting the
autonomy of localities) and before articles 7 and 8 (dividing the Italian republic from the Vatican
and establishing freedom of religion).

18

See discussion part II.C infra. Indeed, the 1999 law does not apply to the five regions
which have passed more protective legislation regarding minority languages. Palermo, supra
note 16, at 61.
19

And did so crudely, perhaps, at least to a reader versed in American Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. Antoni Milian i Massana makes the same point, in a slightly different
context, referring to the Province of Bolzano’s separation of German- and Italian-speaking
students. To Massana, the “separate but equal” idea fails when the criteria for separation of
students bears no relation to the education of the students—a circumstance that distinguishes
racist segregation from functional linguistic separation. ANTONI MILIAN I MASSANA, DERECHOS
LINGUÏSTICOS Y DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL A LA EDUACIÓN. UN ESTUDIO COMPARADO: ITALIA,
BELGICA, SUIZA, CANADA, Y ESPAÑA 134-37 (1994).
20

Palermo, supra note 16, at 63.
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The effect of the 1999 law is to establish a minimum level of protection in accordance
with Article 6, but only for the enumerated minorities. A few of the salient provisions of
the law include: permission for nursery school instruction in minority languages, and
teaching minority culture and traditions in elementary and secondary schools; permission
to use minority languages in official capacity, including before justices of the peace (lowlevel judges); authority for the regions to enter into conventions regarding transmission of
programming relevant to minorities, as well as permission for regions to grant financial
aid to the media to implement use of minority languages.
C.

DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ZONES REGULATING THEIR OWN
LANGUAGE POLICY

Decentralization involves a central state ceding some of its authority in the culturallinguistic realm to sub-state political entities and institutions, usually on a territorial basis.
Decentralization is short of a full-blown federal system, where a sub-state entity may be
granted limited sovereignty. However, by decentralizing or devolving control over the
linguistic sphere of government activity, decentralization improves efficiency, as well as
enhancing democracy and legitimacy.21 Ultimately, because sovereignty is not shared,
the sub-state authorities are responsible to the central state.22
Italy provides an instructive example of decentralization. In addition to its
constitutionally-mandated protective competence, the Italian Constitution sets up a
system of regions, and grants limited autonomous status to the five regions where
linguistic minorities are most entrenched: Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Val d’Aosta, Trentino21

See Montserrat Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political Communities in the Global
Age, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1251, 1260 (2004).
22

See id.
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Alto Adige, Sardegna, and Sicilia. The rights that attach to minority speakers originate in
legislation passed by the regional governments, and such rights are connected to the
territory, not the residents, of the regions.23
Spain’s 1978 Constitution adopts a similar decentralized constitutional system
with respect to its autochthonous languages.24 Despite establishing Castilian as the
official language of Spain, the preamble to the Constitution “proclaims its intention
protect all Spaniards and all the people of Spain in the exercise of their human rights,
their cultures, traditions, languages, and institutions.”25 The inclusion of “languages” in
a preamble’s laundry list falls short of the unambiguous protective mandate contained in
Article 6 of the Italian Constitution, but nevertheless indicates the central role Spain plays
in protecting Spanish language and culture. Article 2, in turn, guarantees a “right to
autonomy” for the “nationalities and regions of which [Spain] is composed . . . .”26
As far as decentralized linguistic policy is concerned, the more interesting passage
is Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution, which explains how the “right to autonomy” is
exercised in the linguistic realm. Article 3, after establishing Castilian as the official
language of Spain, declares that the “remaining Spanish languages also have official

23

For example, a French-speaking inhabitant of the Val d’Aosta can only make use of her
language rights within the Val d’Aosta, and may not rely on those protection outside the region.
This anomaly results in part from the Italian Parliament’s decision not to expand regional
language rights to a nation-wide application. See id. at 55; see also Criminal Proceedings against
Bickel and Franz, Case C-274/96, [1998] ECR I-7637.
24

For a more complete discussion of the Spanish Constitution and linguistic rights, see
Giovanni Poggeschi’s appropriately titled article The Linguistic Struggle in the Almost Federal
Spanish System, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL REGULATION OF ETHNIC RELATIONS
AND CONFLICTS 313, 315 (eds. Zagar, Jesih, & Bester 1999).
25

CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.], preamble (emphasis added) (translation is mine).

26

Id. art 2.
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status in the autonomous communities, in accordance with their respective Statutes.”27
Among the seventeen autonomous communities, provided for in the Constitution itself,
are various groups that have historically had languages of their own (as well as nationalist
aspirations), such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia.28 The basic law for the
autonomous communities is found in their respective Statutes of Autonomy. Pursuant to
Article 3 of the Constitution, the Statute of Aragon promises a forthcoming law (yet to
arrive) protecting Aragonese, and Catalán enjoys equal status with Castilian in Catalonia,
the Balearic Islands, and recognition of a dialect in Valencia. Galician is an official
language in Galicia29, and the Basque language has official status (along with Castilian,
of course) in the Autonomous Basque Community, as well as limited recognition in the
community of Navarra.
The autonomous communities effect linguistic politics and legislation on a
regional level, providing local protection for the local languages. The example of
Catalonia is instructive as to how the system functions. Prior to August 2006, the
linguistic policy of Catalonia was determined in the Ley de política lingüística which the

27

Id., art 3. The Spanish Constitution does not use the term “minority” as the Italian
Constitution does. Giovanni Poggeschi hypothesizes that this absence may be due to the greater
proportion of Spaniards who communicate in an alternate language. See Giovanni Poggeschi,
Linguistic Rights in Spain, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 85 (ed. Snezana Trifunovska 2001).
28

See Guibernau, supra note 21, at 1262; see also Montserrat Guibernau, Spain: Catalonia
and the Basque Country, in MICHAEL O’NEILL & DENNIS AUSTIN, DEMOCRACY AND CULTURAL
DIVERSITY 56 (2000).
29

Recent events exposed a less salubrious effect of minority language policy in Galicia.
Due to a new law requiring Galician language ability for all public service employees, there was
a critical shortage of firefighters to battle the fires afflicting Galicia during the summer of 2006.
See Out of Control, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at 8.
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Catalán Parliament (or Generalitat)30 enacted in 1997 under the jurisdiction of the
autonomous community and in accordance with Article 148(17) of the Spanish
Constitution concerning the rights of the communities to teach in the local language and
encourage minority culture and research. The law reaffirmed the official status of
Catalán, and included a right to be answered in Catalán by a person in the public
administration. The law also included a number of provisions encouraging the use of
Catalán in universities. The most striking aim of that law concerned the use of Catalán
by the media and in the sphere of economic activity. All radio and TV channels
operating within Catalonia must broadcast at least 50% of the time in Catalán, and radio
music must include 25% of songs in Catalán. The law contained further ambitious
intrusions aimed at stimulating many fields of culture industry.31
In August 2006, though, Catalonian linguistic policy underwent an epochal
transformation with the entry into force of a new Statute of Autonomy, approved by the
Catalonian voters on July 18, 2006. The new Statute goes much further than the Ley de
política lingüística. Now, Catalán is “the language of normal and preferential use in
Public Administration bodies and in the public media of Catalonia.”32 Perhaps even more
significantly, the Statute makes Catalán “the language of normal use for teaching and

30

Each autonomous community has a single chamber legislative assembly. Following
regional elections, the leader of the majority party usually assumes the presidency of the
community. For a discussion of the political institutions of the autonomous communities, see
Guibernau, supra note 21, at 1263-64.

31

See generally Poggeschi, supra notes 24, 27.

32

See Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, art. 6.1 (2005).
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learning in the educational system.”33 The Statute also grants official status to Occitan,
one dialect of which, Aranese, is spoken in the province of Aran in Catalonia.34 Article
33.1 of the Statute grants to citizens “the right to linguistic choice.”35 However, later the
Article refers to “each individual[’s] . . . right to use the official language of his or her
choice.”36 It is unclear whether this distinction between citizen and individual37 will
affect the treatment of Catalán speakers in practice, or whether all persons will be able to
avail themselves of the right to use Catalán. The right to linguistic choice applies to all
administrative, notarial, registration, or judicial procedures. Communications by
Catalonian public officials will be executed in Catalán, without prejudice to the rights of
Castilian speakers.38 There is even a “right to be attended” to in Catalán that can be
invoked against private establishments, provided they are “open to the public.”39
D.

AFFIRMATIVE PROTECTION AND RECOGNITION FROM CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT

Other Member States administer similar policies from the central government
authorities—lacking as they do the decentralized regional, or community, structure of
33

Id.; see also id., art. 35.1 (“Catalán shall be used as the teaching and learning language
for university and non-university education.”).

34

Id., art. 6.5. Practically speaking, only “citizens of Aran” possess the right to deal with
the Generalitat in Occitan. See id., art. 36.2.

35

Id., art. 33.1.

36

Id.

37

In U.S. law, the distinction between citizen and person has a particular importance in the
context of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See generally Richard A.
Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 334 (2005).

38

Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, art. 50.5.

39

Id., art. 34.
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Spain and Italy. In the Netherlands, for instance, the Frisian language is spoken in
Friesland, a province with a population of 610,000.40 Almost 55% of the provincial
population considers Frisian to be their mother tongue, and about 75% know how to
speak it.41 The Dutch government has stated formally that, along with Dutch, Frisian is
an indigenous language of the Netherlands.42 Parliament has gone beyond mere
recognition, by enacting measures aimed at accommodating Frisian speakers in Friesland,
including inter alia: detailed rules on the use of Frisian in an administrative or judicial
capacity; rules establishing the legal basis for changing toponymical names from Dutch
into Frisian; provisions to encourage the use of Frisian in schools.43
Though the Frisian language is not threatened, and seems to be enjoying a wide
range of accommodating measures from the central Dutch government, it must be
remembered that the Dutch Constitution is silent with respect to minority languages,44
and that the Friesland province has no decentralized grant of authority, from the
constitution or otherwise, to take affirmative protective measures. In the Netherlands, the
central government guarantees minority language rights primarily pursuant to treaty
obligations.45 Similar concessions are made for the Mirandés community in northern
Portugal.46

40

Floris Van Laanen, The Frisian Language in the Netherlands, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN
EUROPE, supra note 27, at 72.
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Indeed, the Netherlands are one of two members of the European Community having a
written constitution which has no mention of official languages. The other is Denmark. Id.
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Another fascinating permutation of this strategy resulted in the “Good Friday
Agreement” entered into between Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1998. That treaty,
among other more urgent objectives, granted limited formal recognition to Irish and
various dialects of Scots in Northern Ireland.47
E.

NONMANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY ACCOMODATION

A fifth mode of member states’ linguistic accommodation—nonmandatory
accommodation—is prevalent, most notably, in the United Kingdom and France. Within
the United Kingdom, there are communities of speakers of the following languages, none
of which have any formal recognition by the state: Welsh, Irish, Gaelic, Cornish, Scots,
and Ulster Scots.48 The furthest Parliament has gone in protecting minority languages is
to provide limited discretion for local courts and public administrators to use the Welsh
language where appropriate.49 The other languages enjoy no formal legal status, but as is
the case with Gaelic, are sometimes used in a local administrative capacity.50

45

See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), art. 27, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

46

See Lei n.7/99, Reconhecimento oficial de direitos linguísticos da comunidade
mirandesa, (29 Jan 1999); see also Despacho Normativo n. 35/99 (5 Jul 1999) (implementing
regulations to provide Mirandés education, including a limited grant of power to local institutions
(“entidades da comunidade”) to participate in the coordination of cultural and educational
projects).

47

Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, U.K.-Ire., 37 I.L.M.
751, 769-70 [hereinafter Good Friday Agreement].

48

http://eurolang.net/State/uk.htm.

49

Id.

50

Id.
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France, more than any other Member State, adopted the “ostrich approach” to its
minority languages.51 Article 2 of the French Constitution is notably the only article of
that document addressing language: “French is the language of the Republic.”52
Postcolonial France has been the prototype of an assimilation-oriented society,53 and has
yet to extend formal recognition to its autochthonous minority languages, despite the fact
that an estimated 9 million or so French citizens speak a minority language.54 Indeed, the
French accession to the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages was
stonewalled by the high French constitutional court because certain provisions in the
Charter purported to create group rights (in violation of the unity of the French Republic)
and to grant quasi-official status to minority languages (in violation of Article 2 of the
Constitution).55 The French government has passed a handful of administrative decrees
51

See Adeno Addis, Cultural Integrity and Political Unity: The Politics of Language in
Multilingual States, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 719, 730-31 (2001).

52

LA CONSTITUTION, art. 2 (amended in 1992) (translation is mine).

53

See Palermo, supra note 2, at 302 (discussing the unitary conception of French
citoyenneté). Cf also. Loi n. 75-1349 du 31 décembre 1975 (“la loi Bas-Lauriol”). That law
rendered obligatory the use of the French language for various commercial activities, so much so
that recourse to foreign words could be used in the obligatory French version only if there was no
similar French expression. Perhaps appropriately, the President of the Republic at the time the
law was passed was Valéry Giscard D’Éstaing; the Prime Minisiter was Jacques Chirac. In the
field of language policy, Suzanne Citron relates much of French intransigency and repression of
its minority languages back to the leaders of the Third Republic (1870-1940) who, as “heirs of the
revolutionaries, were like [their ancestor revolutionaries], impermeable to the ideaa possible
existence of cultures other than their own in France.” SUZANNE CITRON, L’HISTOIRE DE FRANCE:
AUTREMENT 174 (1992).
54

See Les 75 Langues Minoritaires de France, L’HUMANITÉ, June 25, 1999, available at
http://www.humanite.presse.fr/journal/1999-06-25/1999-06-25-291951 (last visited 16 Feb.
2006).
55

See CC decision no. 99-412DC, June 15, 1999, Rec. __. One commentator has suggested
that the Conseil constitutionel’s sweeping conclusions all but extinguished the hope for focused
constitutional amendments designed to clear the way for passage of the Charter. See Karin
Oellers-Frahm, International Decision: Charte Éuropéenne des Langues Régionales ou
Minoritaires, 93 AM.J.INT’L L. 938941 (1999).
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and laws regarding the school instruction of minority languages, as well as their presence
in the mass media. Such measures are predictably toothless, and are nearly always
phrased so as to give ultimate discretion to the teachers, school administration, or those
wielding discretion of the public media.56
F.

EUROPEAN UNION EFFORTS TO PROTECT MINORITY LANGUAGES

While Member States have developed an elaborate architecture of minority
language rights, the European Union has not pursued the point with comparable zeal—at
least not at the legal level.57 Indeed, the European Union does not formally recognize
linguistic minorities.58 This is not to say the EU has not visited the issue of regional and
minority languages; to the contrary, the E.C. institutions have made numerous soft law
pronouncements and funded projects to protect minority languages. The EU should be
commended for its growing concern about minority rights, but this paper argues that such
efforts are limited by the structural incompatibility of European integration with the legal
56

See, e.g., Loi n. 51-46 du 11 janvier 1951 (“la Loi Deixonne”) (“Des instructions
pédagogiques seront adressés aux recteurs en vue d’autoriser les maîtres à recourir aux parlers
locaux dans les écoles primaires et maternelles chaque fois qu’ils pourront en tirer profit pour
leur enseignement, notamment pour l’étude de la lange française.”) (emphasis added). See also
Loi n. 84-52 du 26 janvier 1984 (“la Loi Savary”) (accomplishing a comprehensive overhaul of
the French university system, and including only a passing reference to the importance that the
education system “veille à la promotion et à l’enrichissement de la langue française et des langues
et cultures régionales”) (emphasis added). Such treatment was extended to all levels of education
in 1989. For media, a decree was issued in 1987 urging the national radio authorities to
contribute “to the expression and information of cultural, social, and professional communities.”
See supra note 32 (translations are mine).

57

See Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union
After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 331, 358-59 (2003). In her otherwise
searching article, Professor Caruso puts too little emphasis on the current structural
incompatibility of EU law with protection of minority rights. It is not enough to say the
“complex legacy of the economic integration project” constitutes an “institutional limit”
burdening the “Union’s commitment to minority languages”. Id., at 358. The ethos of the
integration project has been universalizing and centered on individual rights, and not group
rights. This point is discussed in more detail below.
58

Palermo, supra note 2, at 299.
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protection of regional and minority linguistic groups. Nevertheless, the EU seems
determined to protect, albeit within its limited sphere of competences, such languages,
and some of its prominent efforts are described here.
i.

SOFT LAW AND PROJECT FUNDING

The European Parliament, for instance, has made four Resolutions from 1981 to
1994 regarding the situation of minority language communities.59 In response to the
1981 Resolution,60 Parliament created the European Bureau of Lesser Used Languages
(“EBLUL”) in 1982.61 That same year, Parliament initiated the B3-1006 budget line,
entitled “Promotion of Regional and Minority Languages”, which provides funds for
financing measures supporting minority languages.62 Parliament used B3-1006 to
finance projects to sustain regional and minority languages, including the
EUROMOSAIC network63 and MERCATOR,64 and provided support for studies on the
interface of language and integration.65

59

See Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a
Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities, O.J. C287/106 [1981]; Resolution on Measures in Favour
of Linguistic and Cultural Minorities, O.J. C68/103 [1983]; Resolution on the Languages and
Cultures of the Regional and Ethnic Minorities in the European Community, O.J. C318/160
[1987] (regretting the lack of progress made in response to previous resolutions); Resolution on
Linguistic Minorities in the European Community, O.J. C61/110 [1994].

60

The so-called “Arfé report”, named after the Italian Rapporteur, Gaetano Arfé.

61

The EBLUL has as its mission the promotion of active EU policy-making in favor of
regional or minority languages and the defense of linguistic rights. The languages EBLUL aim to
protect are indigenous, and do not include the languages of immigrant communities, or dialects of
official Member State languages. EBLUL considers itself to be representative of over 50 million
EU citizens. EBLUL is not an EU institution, but is funded mainly by the Commission. See
generally http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/langmin/langmin_en.html.

62

A budget line is an addendum annually appropriated by the Parliament devoting funds to
an area of its choosing. Budget Line B3-1006 has been renewed every year since its inception.
See Gabriel Van Toggenburg, The EU’s Endeavours For Its Minorities, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN
EUROPE, supra note 27, at 205, 215 n.30.
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More recently, the European Union and the Council of Europe joined together to
proclaim 2001 as the “European Year of Languages.”66 The Commission has also funded
a number of innovative education projects, covering not only the official languages of the
Community,67 but minority languages as well.68 The effect of these and countless other
measures the Community doubtless will undertake cannot be measured. While their
effect may escape us, the undeniable message is to be applauded: the EU cares about
minority languages. However, in the end, these and other such programs lack the
strictures of legal norms and rules that the Member States already have in place.
In July of 2006, the European Parliament granted to speakers of Catalán, Basque,
or Galician the right to communicate with the EU legislature in their native language.
The success of the Spanish minorities is no doubt due in part to their strong domestic
political position, as well as the recent successes of the Catalán minority in expanding
their Statute of Autonomy. Excepting these Spanish minority languages, parties may

63

The EUROMOSAIC network combines resources and scholars from Barcelona’s Institut
de Sociolinguistica Catalana, the Centre du recherche sur le plurilinguisme in Brussels, and
Bangor’s Research Centre Wales. Id. at 215.

64

MERCATOR is a computer database which aims to improve the circulation of
information regarding minority languages within and without the EU. Adam Biscoe, The
European Union and Minority Nations, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE ‘NEW’ EUROPE 89, 102 n.48
(Peter Cumper and Steven Wheatley eds., 1999).
65

See id.

66

European Parliament and Council Decision 1934/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 232) 1.

67

There are twenty-one working languages of the Community—the official languages of
each Member State. On July 13, 2005, Irish was included as a working language to go into effect
January 2007.

68

Caruso, supra note 57, at 359.
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communicate with EU institutions only in official EU languages.69 A recent report by the
EU Parliament Committee on Culture and Education called for all EU institutions to
communicate with citizens in their own national languages, irrespective of the official
status of the language at the EU or Member State level.70
ii.

ARTICLE 151

The only hard treaty law prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam even acknowledging
the existence of minorities within the European Union is Article 151 (ex Art. 128) of the
EC Treaty, which instructs the Community to “contribute to the flowering of the cultures
of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the
same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.”71 Article 151 also instructs
the Community to “take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions
of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote diversity of its cultures.”72
Article 151 mirrors Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, which states that the EU “shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic

69

Cf. supra note 67.

70

Bernat Joan I Marí, Draft Report on a New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism,
June 29, 2006, para. 22, available at http://eurolang.net/files/draft_multilingualism.pdf (last
visited Aug. 14, 2006). The Draft Report also calls for the amendment of EC Treaty Articles 13
and 151, the inadequacies of which are discussed in the paragraphs that follow. See id., para. 28.

71

Treaty Establishing the European Community [hereinafter EC Treaty], art. 151, O.J. C
340/173 (2003) (emphasis added). Article 151 further provides “[t]he Community shall take
cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in
order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures,” thus creating an affirmative
obligation on the part of the Community to recognize the impact economic integration has on
local and regional cultures and languages. Id.

72

Id. at para. 4.
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diversity.”73 The inclusion of Article 151 in the Maastricht Treaty evinces the delegates’
concern with the effects of the integration project on regional cultural diversity, but it
does not constitute the clear competence or mandate that the EU would need to act
decisively and affirmatively—as the Member States have done—in favor of collective
group rights for minorities.
In stark contrast to the core economic Community competences, the impact of
Article 151 has not produced significant results, and is limited to the funding of a small
handful of cultural projects.74 Indeed, some scholars have argued that minorities have
benefited more from legislation passed under market-based treaty provisions—relying on
a chance confluence of market demands with group demands for rights—than under
Article 151 itself.75 If that is true, the future of minority rights in the European Union
currently hangs in the balance between an unsteady combination with market
considerations on the one hand, and on the other, a steady stream of funded projects with
debatable effects.
iii.

PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AS ACCESSION CRITERION

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 awakened the Community to the vital stake it
had in the stability and progress of their neighbors to the East.76 This renewed interest

73

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, art. 22, 2000 OJ (C
364). The Charter is an ambitious set of commitments assented to by all three legislativeexecutive institutions of the EU. It has no status as positive law at the moment, however. It has
been incorporated into the text of the EU Constitution discussed infra in Part II.F.v.

74

The most influential programs have been merged into one program entitled CULTURE
2000. Palermo, supra note 2, at 300 n.6.

75

Id. at 300 (mentioning importance of Council Directive of 1977 providing for education
of children of migrant workers in their mother tongue).

76

See Florence Benoît-Rohmer, THE MINORITY QUESTION IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A
COHERENT SYSTEM OF PROTECTION FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES 29 (1996). Benoît-Rohmer
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found expression in the so-called European Agreements with Central and Eastern
European nations.77 In 1993, at the Copenhagen Summit, the Council adopted a
Commission Report on enlargement that provided, inter alia, that a condition precedent
to any eventual accession to the E.C. was respect for and protection of the rights of
minorities.78 These conditions are now embodied in the Community’s Association
Agreements, which require the recognition of minority nations.79 The EU’s foreign
policy has focused on the protection of minorities in non Member States outside the
accession context as well.80
Interestingly, there was (and is, pending acceptance of the EU Constitution) no
such requirement for the current Member States of the European Union. Some
commentators have criticized the Union that the recognition of minority rights is an ideal
to be consumed abroad, but ignored in the internal market.81 Indeed, Article 6 of the

highlights the Pact on Stability (1995), a political undertaking (but not a treaty) signed by the
members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as a momentous
achievement for its contribution to stability and management of border conflicts and minority
issues after the Yugoslav crisis. The European Union chaired the two regional round table
conferences
77

The European Agreements included Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Bulgaria, and Romania. Biscoe suggests the interest in East Europe was motivated by a fear of
“right wing authoritarian and nationalist forces” intent on stepping into the power vacuum.
Biscoe, supra note 64, at 97.

78

Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen, SN 180/93 (June
21-22 1993) (“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection
of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces in the Union.”) (emphasis added).
79

Biscoe, supra note 64, at 98.

80

See id. passim.

81

See, e.g., Bruno de Witte, Politics Versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Ethnic
Minorities, in EUROPE UNBOUND: ENLARGING AND RESHAPING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE

21-Aug-06]

E.U. APPROACH TO MINORITY LANGUAGES

23

Treaty on European Union replicates the language of the Copenhagen Agreements, but
omits the reference to the respect and protection of minorities.82 Protection of minority
rights is a sine qua non for the admission into the European Union, but once a state enters
the EU, it seems, rights for the minorities residing within its boundaries lose their legal
protection. In a sense, the requirement emphasizes the blind spot within the EU
framework: the EU pressures future members to shore up constitutional and legal
protection for minorities ex ante, because it knows that once admitted, such efforts are
currently outside the scope of the Treaties, and the EU will be powerless to address
them.83
iv.

ARTICLE 13

The Amsterdam Treaty included Article 13 at the urging of those wishing to
pressure the EU into solidifying a firm foundation for social rights.84 That article applies

EUROPEAN UNION 137 (Jan Zielonka ed., 2002) (2000) (defining the minority rights requirement
as “an export article and not one for domestic working consumption”); Graínne De Burca, On
Enlargement of the European Union: Beyond the Charter: How Enlargement Has Enlarged the
Human Rights Policy of the European Union, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 679, 700-01 (2004).
82

Treaty on European Union, art. 6, O.J. C 340/173 (1997).

83

It could be argued that the inclusion of a minority rights requirement in the accession
criteria, which are based on the common constitutional principles of the Member States, implies
the existence of a common constitutional obligation on the part of all, including current, Member
States. See Palermo, supra note 3, at 301. Such an argument may be internally coherent, but the
discussion supra on the Member States’ constitutional treatment of minorities belies this point.
There is great diversity in treatment, and some Member States still hold tight to their “proclaimed
homogeneity.” Benoît-Rohmer, supra note 50, at 18 (mentioning France and Greece, in
particular). But see Bruno de Witte, Surviving in Babel? Language Rights and European
Integration, in THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 277 (eds. Dinstein &
Tabory 1992) (“There seems to be a gradual emergence of a common European standard for the
treatment of linguistic minorities . . . .”).
84

Several European parliamentarians became advocates for minority groups in Amsterdam.
See Toggenburg, supra note 62, at 228.
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the non-discrimination principle embedded in Article 1285 to a wider array of situations.
The text reads as follows:
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within its
limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.86
In granting the Community the competence “to take appropriate action” to combat
discrimination, Article 13 opens a new juridical space for Community action. However,
closer examination reveals that unanimity is required87 for any action, and the limiting
phrase “within its limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community” suggests a
more modest scope than Article 12’s “within the scope of application of this Treaty.”88
Another limitation is the exclusively consultative role held by the European Parliament,
which is the Community organ that minority groups can most easily access. A still more

85

Article 12 provides as follows:
Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to
any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds
of nationality shall be prohibited.
The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in
Article 251, may adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination.
EC Treaty, art. 12.

86

Id., art. 13.

87

Some commissioners sought, unsuccessfully, to introduce qualified majority voting into
the Article 13 law-making process. Toggenburg, supra note 62, at 228.

88

This is especially clear after the ECJ’s ruling in Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern,
Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-2691 [hereinafter Martinez Sala], which greatly expanded the
scope of Article 12 by a broad reading of Article 18’s creation of EU citizenship.
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fundamental limitation is the lack of competence for the EU to enact measures of positive
discrimination in favor of minorities.89
Nevertheless, Article 13 moves in the right direction to protection for minorities
in two ways. First, the Article explicitly recognizes that discrimination exists. Article 13
instructs the Community to “combat” a pre-existing problem. Second, Article 13 moves
away from market criteria towards a substantive protective competence for the EU.
Article 13 authorizes the Community to take affirmative measures to eradicate
discrimination not just based on nationality, but of eight other categories of difference. It
is albeit a small step, but I believe an important one, in the development of EU law with
respect to minorities. Even though it does not grant the EU carte blanche to legislate on
behalf of minority groups, Article 13 acknowledges the minority group difference that
exists in the EU,90 and incorporates it for the first time in a grant of power to the
Community institutions.
v.

THE EU CONSTITUTION91 AND MINORITY LANGUAGES

The Draft Constitution for the European Union, presented in July 2003, omitted
any mention of minority rights.92 Advocacy groups mobilized to express outrage over the
lacuna and obtained some interesting language in the current Constitutional Treaty
89

Toggenburg, supra note 62, at 230.

90

This acknowledgment is, on my reading, evident in the inclusion of discrimination based
on “racial or ethnic origin,” which would apply equally to non-EU minorities and autochthonous
minorities within the Member States. Implicit in the concept of discrimination based on “racial or
ethnic origin” is discrimination against a minority group.

91

The Treaty was signed by Council members on October 29, 2004, and is now open for
consideration by the various Member States. Following the “no” votes of France and the
Netherlands, the momentum for ratification has been dissipated.

92

See DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, submitted to
President of European Council on July 18, 2003, Doc. CONV 850/03, available at
http://european-convention.eu.int/ docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
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subject to popular approval in the respective Member States. Article I-2 states that “[t]he
Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities.”93 Structurally, this language is front and center. However,
closer examination reveals that it possesses more in common with preambular language
than anything else. The phrase is descriptive and not prescriptive, and would not create a
new competence for Community action. Interestingly, the language recalls the
Copenhagen criteria for accession discussed supra, and may correct the asymmetrical
obligations inhering in those criteria.94 In so doing, the proposed Article I-2 may provide
a lowest common denominator for countries with abysmal records of protecting minority
rights. What—if any—the contours of such a minimum obligation would be are not
apparent from the text and not susceptible to an expansive reading by the ECJ.
Another passage merits attention. Article I-3(3) includes in a list of the EU’s
objectives a hortatory reminder to “respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and . .
. ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”95 This passage,
unlike Article I-2, formed part of the original July 2003 Draft Constitution. In it, we have
the first mention of linguistic diversity in an EU treaty. However, the language largely
tracks Article 151 and absent a more specific command, is unlikely to create an EU
competence to act on behalf of minority languages.

93

TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, Oct. 24, 2004, art. I-2, O.J. (C
310) 1 (2004) available at http://europa.eu.int/constitution/en/lstoc1_en.htm (last visited May 10,
2005).
94

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.

95

Id., art. I-3(3).
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Any discussion of the EU Constitution must at least acknowledge the events of
the Dutch and French “no” votes, and the more general failure of the pro-Constitution
forces to present a compelling case in favor of ratification. The reasons for the “no”
votes, and the successive stalling of the ratification process, are manifold. Whether
voters were expressing their desire for “less Europe” or for a more coherent Europe (i.e.,
“yes to Europe, but not this Europe”) is a question up for debate,96 but it is indisputable
that the “no” advocates were able to tap into diffused sentiment that held, rightly or
wrongly, that the EU was distant from its citizens. The perception that European
integration means homogenization of the Member States’ cultures and particularities is a
common theme that anti-Europe political forces, especially on the Right, have made use
of repeatedly. Of course, the “no” vote is too complicated to be reduced to a mere
nationalistic appeal to sovereignty and identity, but the success of the anti-integration
appeal to “less Europe” depends in part on the EU’s own failure to take into account the
continued resonance and relevance of identity in the EU citizenry.
This inadequacy is a broad phenomenon, mostly outside the scope of this article.
However, the conflict between individual and group rights in the context of minority
languages is one particular manifestation of this broad failure. Solving the minority
language problem will do very little, in itself, to remedy the failure of the pro-integration
forces to construct a compelling narrative as to why further integration is desirable, but to
the extent that such an approach allows the EU to develop a vocabulary sufficient to
accommodate non-market and cultural realities, it may contribute to the discussion of EU
integration.

96

See TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, EUROPA: UNA PAZIENZA ATTIVA 36-38 (2006).
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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN GROUP RIGHTS AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A.

INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GROUP RIGHTS: WHY THE DISTINCTION MATTERS

At this stage, it will be helpful to step back a bit and sketch the boundaries of the
categories of group rights and individual rights as those terms are used in this article. The
generality of the phrase “group rights” may cause some confusion.97 If we are to label
group privileges as “rights,” then there must be some action that separates these “rights”
from, say, a mere rhetorical appeal to a group or collectivity, with reference to a
normative prescription. A legal right, in general, is an entitlement or justified claim that a
legal system recognizes as legitimate according to a correct interpretation of its own rules
and principles.98 As the term is used in this article, “group rights” refer to legal
entitlements or privileges, dispensed by the sovereign, to individuals by virtue of their
membership to a community. This definition necessarily excludes the right of a group
(say, to self-determination or secession), which are addressed to a group qua nation or
“people.” The group language rights that are of importance in the context of European
integration are vested in individuals, but are not available to all individuals qua
individuals. Instead, recourse to these rights is conditioned on the existence of (1) a
relevant group and (2) an individual’s membership in that group. This concept of group
rights, then, recognizes linguistic minorities as a protectable group, but opts to protect
individuals belonging to the group rather than protecting the group as such. In this vein,

97

An extensive discussion of the concept of group rights can be found in MARLIES
GALENKAMP, INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS COLLECTIVISM: THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
(1998).
98

See Dwight G. Newman, Collective Interests and Collective Rights, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 127,
128 (2004).
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it is possible to speak of “group subjectivity” even though the rights are, sensu strictu,
granted to individuals.
A cursory discussion of the importance of the individual in modern thought may
provide a helpful background. Since World War II and the establishing of the United
Nations, individual rights have displaced group rights as the dominant form of protecting
individuals.99 A U.N. study observed, with respect to the League of Nations system of
minority protection, that
This whole system [of minority group protection] was overthrown by the
Second World War. All the international decisions reached since 1944
have been inspired by a different philosophy. The idea of a general and
universal protection of human rights is emerging. It is therefore no longer
only the minorities in certain countries which receive protection, but all
human beings in all countries.100
Of course, the emphasis on the individual is hardly a Twentieth Century
invention. One of the key characteristics of modernity is the progressive privileging of
the individual, in the religious and social, as well as the juridical, realms. Thus,
Christianity re-ordered the individual’s relation to the cosmos by putting him in direct
communion with God. The Reformation was a further development of modern religion’s
emphasis on individual communion with the divine. The Renaissance101 and the
Enlightenment,102 too, are periods thought of primarily in terms of their development of

99

James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards a New Theory of the State
Under International Law, BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 193, 206 (1999).

100

Study of the Legal Validity of the Undertakings Concerning Minorities, U.N. DOC
E/CN.4/367.

101

See, e.g., JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY 98119 (1990); cf. also GIORGIO VASARI, THE LIVES OF THE ARTISTS (describing the Renaissance as
a reawakening of painting from a long slumber spurred on by the individual genius, or ingegno,
of Tuscan artists such as Cimabue, Duccio di Buoninsegna, and Giotto).
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ideas of, respectively, humanistic and rationalist individualism. Radical individualism in
the form of subjectivism and existentialism developed in the first half of Twentieth
Century.
Unanchored from the values and roots that tied its constituent groups together,103
European society in the period leading to the Second World War witnessed a radical reordering of the State, individuals, and groups. Despite their outward appeals to group
identity, the fascism and National Socialism that convulsed Europe in the 1920s and
1930s were not so much a revival of group solidarity as they were symptoms of a
growing dissolution of traditional values that were enforced in part by group
accountability. The post-World War II emphasis on individual rights results from a
realization that the dissolution of group solidarity had left individuals powerless against
an Almighty State.104

102

See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (1995) (moral law
requires that humans are treated as ends in themselves, and never as means). In a different
iteration of Enlightenment individualism, the “social contract” models of both Locke and
Rousseau liberate individuals from the natural law framework and make their continued
participation in society depend, at least theoretically, on their consent.
103

Heidegger and Weber discuss this phenomenon at length from different viewpoints.
Compare Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in BASIC WRITINGS 307
(David F. Krell, ed. 1993) (warning that reliance on technology threatens to “enframe” the entire
human experience and undermine any conception of human beings beyond functional means to
an end) with Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129,
155 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., 1946) (describing modernity in terms of rationalization
and intellectualization, which “disenchant” man from the sense of religiosity that “in former times
swept through the great communities like a firebrand, welding them together”).
104

Hannah Arendt did not consider the modern State’s tendency to centralize and expand
political life to be, in and of itself, problematic. Instead, the totalitarian problem resulted when
nationalist ideology became conflated with the State. The atomized individualism inherited from
the Nineteenth Century liberalism was connected to the State by the “solid cement of national
sentiment.” See Hannah Arendt, The Nation, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING 1930-1945:
FORMATION, EXILE, AND TOTALITARIANISM 206, 209 (1994).
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The free-market utopianism of Twentieth Century liberalism is a different
movement in the same direction toward the dominion of the individual. Individual rights
have been used to drive the integration of post-World War II Europe under the theory that
economic interdependence would eradicate nationalistic violence. The EU can be
conceptualized both as a contribution to, and consequence of, an ever-increasing
individual-centered legal rights framework. Of course, these sketches are rendered with
the broadest of brushes, and are meant merely as a general evidence of the increasing
alienation of group solidarity and belonging in the modern period.
However, the appeal to the group or collectivity still resonates with us.105 Groups
still “matter.” It is still possible to refer to ethnic or cultural solidarity, and the
importance of “cultural diversity” testifies to a general recognition that we also see
cultures and groups as irreducible to mere aggregates of individuals. Some
commentators have sought to portray the EU as an inflexible mechanism moving towards
assimilation and normalization, to the detriment of particularities.106 This view has
assumed the negative to be true as well: namely, that group rights will, for better or
worse, occasion an erosion of the individual rights framework on which the EU legal
order is premised. A basic assumption of this article is that such a reductive approach

105

Dwight Newman provides the example of Quebecois secession as an example of the
moral resonance of group-thinking. According to Newman, supporters of secession do not say
“there are seven million Quebecois that desire secession, therefore secession is obligated.”
Instead, appeals to independence refer to a “distinct culture, a distinct identity, and so on.”
Newman, supra note 98, at 145. Of course, the appeal to a group necessarily depends on a
multiplicity of persons, but the persuasiveness of the argument for a group right (e.g., a right to
secession) does not depend on the number of persons. The relevance of numbers is at best
tangentially relevant.

106

Padoa-Schioppa discusses these critiques in EUROPA: UNA PAZIENZA ATTIVA, supra note
96 at 70-72.
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fails to appreciate the potential complimentarity of individual and group rights. Indeed,
to the extent that failure to accommodate minority languages into the EU legal
framework provides an excuse for otherwise integration-sympathetic groups to subvert
the integration process, the destiny of the EU may be, in part, tied up with the destiny of
minority language groups.107
An oft-cited example of a strong group rights language is found in Article 27 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,
to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.108
The rights themselves are vested in individuals, but only those individuals who are
members of a cultural group. Therefore, a necessary precondition to the vesting of any
rights under Article 27 in individual “persons belong to . . . minorities” is the existence of
a group. Article 27 refers outward toward an extant cultural situation. Because it relies
on a descriptive state of cultural affairs, it is different than merely a grant of group rights
to certain collectivities. It is also different than a general and universal individual right to
associate, because here, again, the law refers outward to certain extant groups.
Another example, discussed supra in Part II.B, is the Italian Republic’s 1999 Law
passed pursuant to Article 6 of the Italian Constitution. That law mandates certain
guarantees that the government must provide to members of enumerated cultural and
linguistic minorities. Indeed, that law in many respects goes much further than Article
107

Cf. Addis, supra note 51, at 725-26 (“The choice, therefore, is not between national unity
on the one hand and the acknowledgement and affirmation of linguistic differences on the other
hand. Rather, the issue is what institutional structures would enable us to strengthen national
unity while affirming and cultivating linguistic diversity.”).

108

ICCPR, art. 27.
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27. Not only does the law prevent discrimination against members of certain minorities,
but it also provides for affirmative rights that members of the minority community may
invoke in public life.
Victor Segesvary’s distinction here between sui generis group rights and quasi-group
rights is helpful. Sui generis group rights are “derived from the constitution of a specific
social and cultural environment by groups of men, having its distinctive symbolic
orderings, belief- and value-systems, and particularly important, shared historic
experience.”109 Sui generis group rights are invoked so that a community may flourish.
The group language rights discussed in this article are sui generis group rights. Quasigroup rights (e.g., rights for the disabled, homosexual rights) arise merely because of
accidental or biological facts that link the individuals together into the group. There is no
cultural commonality of homosexual persons or disabled persons: there are merely
homosexual and disabled persons across numbers of cultures. The sui generis group right
aims to protect cultural or linguistic communities as a legal subject independent of the
individual members of that group.
Other group or collective rights are based on the aggregative interests of the
individual members that constitute the group, and are thus distinguishable from sui
generis group rights. A labor union is an example of such a collectivity. It may be
important to protect the right for labor to organize, but it makes no sense to say that the
United Auto Workers itself has a right to exist. Instead, its members each possess an
individual right to organize. The right, though, is functional, and does not depend on an
extant situation, but rather the possibility and potential for different organizations and
109

Victor Segesvary, Group Rights: The Definition of Group Rights in the Contemporary
Legal Debate Based on Socio-Cultural Analysis, 3 INT’L J. GROUP RIGHTS 89, 102 (1995).
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groupings in the future. In the case of a union, the “group” right is merely an aggregative
right of the individual members. If ever the members decided that a greater number
preferred a splinter union, then the UAW would perhaps cease to exist, and no one would
lament the violation of its “rights.”
An illustrative example of a group right—as distinguished from a mere aggregate
of individual rights—is a special fishing right granted to an indigenous community.110
Let us suppose that the state grants to members of that community the right to fish in the
salmon-rich streams that run through the community’s traditional homeland year-round.
These fishing rights are at once individual rights and group rights. For any non-fishing
individual, it may be sensible to trade his rights for an alternative privilege or payment.
More interestingly, other individuals may garner a personal satisfaction, unrelated to their
community-belonging, from fishing. For example, maybe it is cheaper to fish than to buy
at market, or perhaps it is a day’s ride to the next comparable stream. However,
assuming the state could grant some substitutive privilege or payment to compensate for
the aggregate individual interests, the individual would not suffer, but the community
would. In this example, the sui generis group right is intended as the bulwark to protect
the community from suffering even if the individuals are “bought off.” The sui generis
group right recognizes the intrinsic value of the group and cannot be derived from the
rights of the individual members.
B.

THE EU AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

From the perspective of the Member States, integration is fundamentally a process
of surrendering sovereignty. Member States formerly exerted plenary powers over their

110

I borrow this example from Newman, supra note 98 at 156.
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internal markets, foreign affairs, and borders; now, with the expansion of qualified
majority voting, the extent of Member State participation in those fundamental
competences can be as minimal as casting a losing vote against a majority of other
states.111 From the inception of the EEC, minorities subject to the centralized policies of
the Member States hoped that the progress towards integration would occasion a
diminution of Member State authority and a concomitant increase in autonomy for
regions and the minorities that often have greater leverage on the sub-state level.112
Expectations were high that the European Community’s approach would create a oneway ratchet, moving inevitably to more minority protection.
The Community institutions have fallen short of these aspirations, and Member
States, as we have seen supra, have, with varying success and enthusiasm, propped up the
minority and regional languages with a protective legal framework. The reason for the
EU’s failure is that the EU has opted for an individual rights—and not a group rights113—

111

The ECJ, in Van Gend en Loos, describes the Community for what it is: “the [European]
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which states have
limited their sovereign rights . . . .” Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 1. The EU has become increasingly active in the day-today affairs of its citizens, having largely accomplished its goal of market integration, and recently
moving toward a substantive concept of citizenship. See, e.g., Martinez Sala, supra note 88. The
surrender of state sovereignty in the field of application of the Treaties is necessary for the
achievement of the Treaties’ objectives. While such surrender was integral to the European
economic integration, the process exacted (and exacts today) a price on the protection of cultural
and linguistic minorities.
112

See de Witte, supra note 83, at 277. Hopes that integration would allow for the
development of a “Europe of Regions” relied on a neofunctionalist conception of a European
Community that forges connections and linkages between substate and suprastate groups that
ultimately weaken the exclusive power of the Member States. For an elaboration on the
neofunctionalist conception of integration, see generally Paul Craig, The Nature of the
Community, in THE EVOLUTION OF E.U. LAW 49 (eds. Craig & de Búrca 1999).
113

Nathan Glazer has written on these dueling approaches to rights of minorities in the
context of race in the United States. He suggests that multicultural nations (and by analogy,
supranational polities like the EU) all must engage in a debate over which rights approach to take
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approach to realize its overarching goal that the “internal market is to comprise an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital is ensured . . . .”114 An integrated Europe is a single market, and the individual
market actors are its constitutive atoms. Minority group rights, which have been the
subject of so much Member State law, do not fit easily into—and indeed may be at odds
with—this market-based framework.115 The concept of sui generis group rights—and the
idea that linguistic minorities may be irreducible legal subjects—has not yet entered into
the mainstream vocabulary of Community institutions.
Europe’s legal space is now defined by two sets of actors (EU institutions and
Member State governments) and the resulting form of governance has naturally had an
effect on citizens’ rights. The transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the EU
interrupts the relationship between the individual and the state as dispenser of rights.116

to further justice. See NATHAN GLAZER, ETHNIC DILEMMAS: 1964-1982, 254-70 (1983). A
similar debate has raged the past few decades in American Equal Protection jurisprudence. For
the most part, the Supreme Court has taken an individual rights approach to the 14th Amendment.
See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1980); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995). However, dicta from the Court’s recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, may
suggest an increased willingness to look at group rights, at least for a period of time. See Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (Justice O’Connor’s 25-year plan seems to suggest that a
group rights approach may be necessary for a period of time).
114

EC Treaty, art. 14(2).

115

Biscoe believes the “ethos of European integration” sees regional cultural diversity as “an
optional extra” which is sacrificed in the drive to create the single market and the perception of a
need to remain competitive in the global economy. Biscoe, supra note 64, at 90. Where
marketplace issues conflict with cultural diversity, the market will always win. He closes his
article with a remonstration to minority groups: “[m]inority nations, and multi-nation states which
are concerned that European economic integration has implications for their cultural diversity,
should take note.” Id. at 99.

116

See Jacqueline Bhabha, Citizenship and Post-National Rights in Europe, 51 INT’L SOC.
SCI. J. 11 (1999). Professor Bhabha sees in European integration a useful context to examine the

21-Aug-06]

E.U. APPROACH TO MINORITY LANGUAGES

37

The ECJ has held that the EU creates directly effective rights that individuals can rely on
against their Member States and EU institutions.117 These legal entitlements are the
implements that have driven the economic integration of Europe. The directly effective
Community economic rights, however, have collateral reverberations felt throughout
Europe as a community of nations or language groups (as distinguished from a
community of markets), and despite the EU’s undeniable overtures to minority groups,118
these effects can destabilize the group rights framework the Member States. This
destabilizing effect will only amplify as EU individual rights continue to expand beyond
traditional market-oriented rights into substantive social and political norms. This
phenomenon will be discussed infra in more depth, but for the moment it suffices to point
out that some domestic rules that aim to ensure group language rights are bound to
conflict with fundamental principles of EU law. The EU’s approach to minority language
has been handicapped by its failure to recognize the sui generis subjectivity of language
groups. The individualist emphasis of the EU institutions is a major cause for this failure.

interaction between the role of the State and the role of supranational bodies in enforcing citizens’
rights.
117

See, e.g., Van Gend en Loos, supra note 111. Moreover, the EC Treaty creates rights that
may be invoked to limit private actions as well. See Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de
Navigation Aérienne Sabena, C-43/75 [1976] ECR 455.

118

See discussion Part II.F. supra. See also De Witte, supra note 83, at 288. Prof. De Witte
posits that the prevailing ethos at the various EU intergovernmental conferences held that
economic integration affected linguistic communication only informally, in contrast to the formal
political decision to focus on a common market. His article was written in 1992, so one must
wonder if his impressions were different at the Amsterdam conference.
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ARTICLES 12 AND 39

Treaty articles 39119 and 12120 are examples of how individual economic rights at
the Community level can conflict with Member States’ efforts to protect groups of
citizens. Both articles prohibit discrimination on the basis of nationality and are among
the most important to the integration effort.121 Article 39’s prohibition aims to secure the
freedom of movement for workers, and Article 12 is a general prohibition of such
discrimination “within the scope of application” of the Treaty. Article 12 has been
described as a right to equal treatment, while Article 39 has been considered more
limited, as it applies only to workers.122 Paragraph 4 exempts public service employment
from the scope of Article 39, in addition to general public policy, security, and health.123

119

Article 39 provides that “freedom of workers shall be secured within the Community.”
Moreover, “such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and
other conditions of work or employment.” EC Treaty, art. 39. Article 39 has direct effect, but
was also implemented by Regulation 1612/68. See Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, C-36/75,
[1975] ECR 1219. The article also has horizontal direct effect as established in Roman Angonese
v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, Case C-281/98, [2000] ECR I-4139, paras. 34-36
[hereinafter Angonese].

120

Article 12 provides that “[w]ithin the scope of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited.” EC Treaty, art. 12.

121

Prof. John Handoll anticipated the import of Article 39 when he wrote that the ECJ’s
approach to Article 39 in the decades before Martinez Sala reflected the underlying belief that “a
worker is more than a worker; he is an embryonic Community citizen.” John Handoll, Article
48(4) EEC and Non-National Access to Public Employment, 13 EURO. L. REV. 223, 240 (1988).

122

Annette Schrauwen, Sink or Swim Together? Developments in European Citizenship, 23
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 778, 780 (2000).

123

The ECJ case law has all but read the exceptions out of the text of Article 39 and their
implementing directive 64/221. For example, in Rutili the court held that in order for the public
policy exception to obtain, the discrimination must be justified by Community public policy
concerns, not Member State concerns. Rutili, [1975] ECR at 1223. See also Allué v. Università
di Venezia, C-33/88, [1989] ECR 1591 (limiting “public service” exception to the exercise of
“direct or indirect powers conferred by public law and . . . the discharge of functions whose
purpose is to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public authorities and which
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The commitment to creating a single frontier-less market relies on a mobile labor supply
moving efficiently and without obstacles to where it is valued most. Articles 12 and 39
aim to make free supply of labor a reality by vesting rights with individual workers and
EU citizens.124 By eradicating parochial discrimination in the labor market, the EU not
only ensures fair treatment, but affirmatively encourages the movement of workers.125
An obvious conflict between Article 39 and a Member State minority group right
would be a hypothetical rule passed by the autonomous Spanish region of Catalonia
requiring local businesses to employ a specified percentage of Catalonian residents in
factories. Article 3 of Regulation 1612/68 explains that even “indirect” discrimination on
the basis of nationality is prohibited under Article 39.126 Thus, such a provision would be
a clear violation of Regulation 1612/68 since Catalonian residents are predominantly
Spanish citizens. Such a law would threaten the free movement of workers that Article
39 and Regulation 1612/68 aim to achieve. Such a law would patently be designed to
have a protectionist, anti-integration discriminatory effect that benefits a group at the
expense of individual labor market actors. The nexus between the hypothetical law and
Article 39 is all too clear.

therefore require a special relationship of allegiance to the State on the part of persons occupying
them and reciprocity of rights and duties which form the bond of nationality”).
124

“For example, if a Spaniard cannot get a job as a machinist in Germany because there are
arbitrary language requirements, or because the local council will not provide housing, or because
his Moroccan wife will be excluded, or because he has to purchase costly visa requirements, then
his free movement will be hampered.” Bhabha, supra note 116, at 14.

125

See Á. Castro Oliveira, Workers and Other Persons: Step-By-Step from Movement to
Citizenship, Case Law 1995-2001, 39 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 77 (2002).

126

Regulation 1612/68, O.J. C 344/12.
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As mentioned supra in Part I.F.iv, Article 12 articulates a broad commitment to
anti-discrimination “within the scope of application of [the EC] Treaty.”127 The key
question, then, is how far the EC Treaty’s “scope of application” extends. If the “scope
of application” of the Treaty extends beyond workers’ freedom of movement, then
Article 12 sweeps even more broadly than Article 39. To the extent that Article 12
embodies the same principle but applies it to a wider range of conduct, Article 12 will
only increase in relevance. By corollary, the non-discrimination principle will apply to
an increasing array of Member State acts, many of which may not facially seem
implicated by the Treaty at all. Recent cases have confirmed that this is true. The
expanding “scope of application” of the Treaty results from the citizenship concept
introduced to the EC Treaty at Maastricht.128
C.

MARTINEZ SALA AND THE EXPANSION OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

The ECJ, in the Martinez Sala case,129 interpreted Article 12 as applying to all
citizens residing lawfully in a Member State. Ms. Sala, a Spanish citizen, had resided in
Germany for over thirty years, and had been receiving social welfare benefits in the form
of a child-raising allowance since 1986. She had entered Germany to work, but she had
been unemployed for over a decade. She had applied for a German residence permit,
which the authorities were disinclined to give her.130 She then applied for her welfare
127

EC Treaty, art. 12.

128

The Treaty of Maastricht contained, for the first time, a provision on EU citizenship.
That provision is now found in EC Treaty, article 18.

129

130

See supra note 88.

The German authorities had their hands tied because they did not want to issue the permit
to a non-worker, but were prohibited from repatriating her by Article 6(a) of the European
Convention on Social and Medical Assistance.
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benefits. The welfare authorities required Ms. Sala to produce a residence permit, which
she could not, of course, do. German citizens were required only to prove their
residence. Not being able to produce the permit, she was denied the benefits.
The ECJ ruled that requiring an EU citizen to produce a residence permit when
German citizens were not so required constituted impermissible discrimination on the
basis of nationality in violation of Article 12.131 Recalling that Article 12 applies “within
the scope of application of the Treaty,” the ECJ had to decide which aspects of the EC
Treaty were implicated. The ECJ held that the child-raising allowance was a family
benefit under Regulations 1612/68 and 1408/71 and thus fell within the scope of the
Treaty.132 Most striking, though, was the ECJ’s separate finding that citizenship alone,
and not worker status, brought Ms. Sala within the scope of the Treaty: “[a]s a national of
a Member State, lawfully residing in the territory of another Member State, [Ms. Sala] . .
. comes within the scope ratione personae of the provisions of the Treaty on European
citizenship.”133 The implication of the holding in Martinez Sala is that the individual
right to equal treatment attached to the mere fact of EU citizenship.134 No longer, it
seems, would the ECJ require a nexus between the discrimination and the exercise of a
community economic right (e.g., Article 39 and freedom of movement for workers). In
the post-Martinez Sala EU, a Member State must beware not only of enacting measures

131

Martinez Sala, at paras. 64-65.

132

Id. at paras. 39-44.

133

Id. at para. 61.

134

The EU Constitution, if ratified, would make this principle of individual rights flowing
from citizenship explicit in the Treaty text.
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that may impede the exercise of individual economic rights, but also of discriminating
against any EU citizens who happen to be in the country legally—even casually.
Subsequent cases have confirmed this strong view of EU citizenship as a political
and social, and not merely economic, right. The Trojani case,135 for example, involved a
French national applying for social assistance benefits in Belgium. The ECJ directed the
Belgian courts to determine whether the petitioner fell within the ambit of any of Articles
39, 43 (applying to the freedom of establishment), and 49 (applying to the freedom to
provide services) of the EC Treaty. However, even if the Belgian courts answered that
question negatively, the ECJ observed that
a citizen of the European Union who does not enjoy a right of residence in
the host Member State under Articles 39 EC, 43 EC or 49 EC may, simply
as a citizen of the Union, enjoy a right of residence there by direct
application of Article 18(1) EC. The exercise of that right is subject to the
limitations and conditions referred to in that provision. . . . However, once
it is ascertained that a person in a situation such as that . . . is in possession
of a residence permit, he may rely on Article 12 EC in order to be granted
social assistance benefit[s.]136
The ECJ cited to Martinez Sala and Trojani in the 2005 case Queen v. London Borough
of Ealing. In that case, the Court summarized the Trojani case as establishing that “a
citizen of the Union who is not economically active may rely on the first paragraph of
Article 12EC where he has been lawfully resident in the host Member State for a certain

135

136

Trojani v. Centre Public d’Aide Social de Bruxelles, Case C-456/02 [2004].

Id., para. 2; accord Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale, Case C-184/99, [2001]
ECR I -6193 (“[A] citizen of the European Union, lawfully resident in the territory of a host
Member State, can rely on Article 6 [now Article 12] of the Treaty in all situations which fall
within the scope ratione materiae of Community law. Those situations include those involving
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and those involving the
exercise of the right to move and reside freely in another Member State, as conferred by Article
8a [now Article 18] of the Treaty.”).
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time or possesses a residence permit.”137 Borough of Ealing held that an EU citizen’s
rights under Article 12 prohibited the United Kingdom from conditioning receipt of
subsidized school loans on a student’s “settlement” in the country. The British
government conceded that under the terms of the “settlement” provision of the loan
regulation, most non-British Community students would be “unsettled” despite being
legally resident in the country. The ECJ expressly disavowed the holdings in the earlier
Lair138 and Brown139 cases which had held that the assistance was primarily related to
education and social policy and therefore not within the scope of the Treaty.
Moreover, in 2004, the European Council and the EU Parliament promulgated
Directive 2004/38, which governs the free movement of EU citizens. Thus, in part,
Directive 2004/38 supplants Regulation 1612/68, discussed supra in Part II.C, which
addressed the free movement of workers—a more limited subset of individuals. The
directive provides inter alia standards according to which “Union citizens” (defined as
nationals of a Member State) are to be permitted entry to, residence in, and exit from
other Members States. Importantly, the directive creates a near-absolute “right of
residence” during the three months following entry into the host Member State.140
Beyond three months, EU citizens may remain in a host Member State provided they are
studying (with health insurance), working, conducting business, or even merely in
137

Queen (on the application of Dany Bidar) v. London Borough of Ealing, para. 37, Case
C-209/03, [2005] ECR I-2119.

138

Lair, Case C-39/86 [1988] ECR I-3161.

139

Brown, Case C-197/86, [1988] ECR I-3205.

140

Council Directive 2004/38, art. 6.1, 2004 O.J. (L 158) (corrigendum published at 2004
O.J. (L 229)), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_158/l_158200
40430en00770123. pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
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possession of sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the host Member
State’s social assistance system.141 Most important for our purposes is Article 24.1,
which codifies the equal treatment principle flowing from Martinez Sala:
Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the
Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this
Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal
treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the
Treaty.142
While the directive does provide the ubiquitous general reservations for “public
policy, public security or public health,”143 there is no exception for groupprotective measures designed to protect minority languages.
Martinez Sala and Directive 2004/38 affect the minority language problem only
by implication. Ms. Sala, for instance, had nothing to do with Germany’s efforts to
protect languages or minorities; she was denied a simple welfare benefit and the ECJ
found that denial was in violation of her rights as an EU citizen to be free from
discrimination. Before evaluating the impact of Martinez Sala’s expansive concept of
citizenship on Member State protections of minority languages, it is necessary to survey
the actual ECJ rulings in cases where group language rights collide with individual
Community rights.
IV.

MAJOR ECJ CASES ADDRESSING CONFLICT BETWEEN MINORITY LANGUAGE
RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The ECJ interprets the European treaties, and to the extent a Member State law

limits the full enjoyment of the freedoms and rights provided by the treaties and
141

Id., art. 7.1.

142

Id., art. 24.1 (emphasis added).

143

Id., art. 27.1.

21-Aug-06]

E.U. APPROACH TO MINORITY LANGUAGES

45

Community law, the ECJ is charged with affirming the supremacy of EU law144 and
declaring the domestic measure to be in conflict with treaty law. The ECJ decisions in
this field have articulated and defined the principles of non-discrimination and freedom
of workers and persons. Since the treaties are concerned with individual rights, the ECJ
in its role as treaty interpreter, has usually found Member State measures to protect
language groups in violation of Community law.
A.

THE GROENER145 CASE

The Groener case involved a 1979 Irish Ministry of Education regulation that
required schoolteachers to pass an Irish language proficiency exam as a precondition to
attaining a permanent post. When Ms. Groener, a Dutch national and art teacher, failed
her test, she was denied a position over the objection of the school which desired to hire
her. Groener alleged that the regulation violated Article 39 (then Article 48) and, in
particular, was not justified by Article 3(1) of the implementing Regulation 1612/68
which permits states to condition employment on linguistic knowledge when “required
by reason of the nature of the post to be filled.”146
The ECJ held that the regulation did not violate Community law for a
combination of reasons. The Court attached importance to the official primary
144

Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the European Union treaties do not contain an explicit
textual foundation for the supremacy of Community law. The ECJ has guided the affirmation of
Community supremacy through its case law. See Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L’Energia Elettrica
(ENEL), Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585 (holding that in cases of conflict, Community law must be
supreme over domestic law because to hold otherwise would render the direct applicability and
direct effect of Community law meaningless). Costa also reminded Member States that, by
entering into the European Union, they have limited their sovereign rights. Id.
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Groener v. Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Educational
Committee, Case 379/87, [1989] ECR 3967.
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Regulation 1612/68, art. 3(1), O.J. 344/12.
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Pointing out the concerted effort by the

Irish government to preserve and promote its linguistic heritage, the Court also warned
Ireland not to go too far:
The EEC Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the
protection and promotion of a language of a Member State which is both
the national language and the first official language. However, the
implementation of such a policy must not encroach upon a fundamental
freedom such as that of the free movement of workers. Therefore, the
requirements deriving from measures intended to implement such a policy
must not in any circumstances be disproportionate in relation to the aim
pursued and the manner in which they are applied must not bring about
discrimination against nationals of other Member States.148
The requirement of proportionality149 was met in Groener for two reasons. First, the
“privileged relationship” between a teacher and students allowed Article 3(1) to apply
beyond instructors teaching the Irish language.150 Ireland wanted to protect and promote
the language, not merely to teach it, and requiring all teachers to be competent would
encourage spoken Irish in the halls, during recess, and in other classes. Second, the
regulation required competence, not fluency, in Irish. To require fluency, the Court
suggested, could constitute “a level of knowledge [that] is not disproportionate in relation
to the objective pursued.”151 The Court also warned that any requirement that the

147

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

148

Groener, at para. 19 (emphasis added).

149

Prof. Shuibhne compares the cautious proportionality inquiry to a “general international
trend” regarding affirmative action. See Shuibhne, supra note 6, at 71.

150

To so require would, as Advocate General Darmon pointed out in his opinion, “treat
[Irish] as a dead language like Ancient Greek or Latin, and as a language incapable of further
development.” Groener, Opinion of AG Darmon, at para. 22.

151

Id., at para. 21.
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language certification be acquired within the Member State would be a violation of the
principle of non-discrimination.
At the time, the Groener decision was welcomed cautiously by advocates for
minority languages and rights. It appeared the ECJ signed off on a regulation aimed to
protect the Irish language notwithstanding the clear disadvantage to non-Irish teachers
searching employment in Ireland. The decision considered the Irish language as a subject
that could be legally protected. Perhaps more importantly, the ECJ was willing to
recognize that encouraging the usage of minority languages contributed collaterally and
indirectly to the flourishing of the language’s speakers.
Commentators wondered how far the Court was willing to extend this logic. Was
the ECJ willing to provide a “real recognition of the legitimacy of national concerns in
relation to national cultural heritage”? 152 Or was this case an outlying situation, limited
to the Irish anomaly of constitutional recognition and primacy of the minority group’s
language? Would the same analysis hold when the language was protected only
regionally? The subsequent cases dispelled hopes that the ECJ was willing to recognize a
general Member State interest in providing sui generis group rights to minority language
speakers.
B.

THE BICKEL/FRANZ153 CASE

152

Bryan M.E. McMahon, Case Comment on Groener, 27 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 129,
139 (1990). If so, as Prof. McMahon asserted triumphally, “[t]he bureaucrats and the economists
will have to recognise that cultural diversity cannot be indiscriminately swaped in the name of
economic unity.” Id.
153

Criminal Proceedings against Bickel and Franz, Case C-274/96, [1998] ECR I-7637.
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Bickel/Franz came before the ECJ on a preliminary reference154 from a criminal
court in the Trentino-Alto Adige region of Italy on the Austrian border. Article 100 of
the Statute for the region155 provided a special right for German-speaking residents of the
region to have any criminal proceedings against them conducted in German.156 Bickel,
who was an Austrian lorry driver, was being prosecuted for driving under the influence.
Franz, a German tourist, had been charged with possession of an illegal weapon after a
customs search. Neither spoke Italian, and accordingly petitioned the Italian court to
conduct the proceedings in German. The Italian court referred the following question to
the ECJ:
Do the principles of non-discrimination as laid down in the first paragraph
of Article 12, the right to movement and residence for citizens of the
Union as laid down in Article 18 and the freedom to provide services as
laid down in Article 49 of the Treaty require that a citizen of the Union
who is a national of a Member State and is present in another Member
State be granted the right to call for criminal proceedings against him to be
conducted in another language where nationals of that State in the
circumstances enjoy such a right?157
The ECJ separated the referral into two questions:158 first, did the right at question
implicate the Treaty?; and second, if the treaty was implicated, could the region limit the
application of that right to residents of the region?
154

See EC Treaty, art. 234.

155

See discussion supra Part II.C.

156

Special Statute for the Trentino-Alto Adige Region, Presidential Decree No. 670/1992,
art. 100. Cf. supra Part I.C.

157

158

Bickel/Franz, at para. 11.

The ECJ, not to be outdone in prolixity, reformulated the referral thus: “the national court
is essentially asking whether the right conferred by national rules to have criminal proceedings
conducted in a language other than the principal language of the State falls within the scope of the
Treaty and must accordingly comply with Article [12] thereof. If so, the national court also asks
whether Article [12] of the Treaty precludes national rules, such as those at issue, which, in
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The Court ruled that the regulation did involve the individual Treaty rights of
Bickel and Franz. Article 12 required that in any situation governed by Community law,
EU citizens be placed on equal footing with citizens of the respective Member States.159
The “linguistic rights and privileges of individuals” merited the Court’s strictest
attention.160 The mere fact that Bickel and Franz were EU citizens exercising their right
to free movement under Article 18 of the EC Treaty161 implicated the Treaty and as such,
the prohibition of discrimination contained in Article 12 applied. The Court also relied
on Article 49, and the freedom to receive services, as an alternate basis for asserting
jurisdiction.162 The Treaty applied despite the fact that criminal proceedings are normally
an internal affair, reserved to the exclusive discretion of the Member States.163

respect of a particular language other than the principal language of the Member State concerned,
confer on citizens whose language is that particular language and who are resident in a defined
area the right to require that criminal proceedings be conducted in that language, without
conferring the same right on nationals of other Member States traveling or staying in that area,
whose language is the same.” Id. at para. 12.
159

Id. at para. 14.

160

Id. at para. 13 (emphasis added).

161

Article 18 is the same provision the ECJ relied on, that same year, to decide Martinez

Sala.
162

163

Id. at para. 15.

The ECJ had already held that Community law set certain limits to the discretion of
Member States in the field of criminal law. In the Cowan case, a British national, exercising his
Community right to receive services in France, was injured and sought compensation pursuant to
a French penal law that provided restitution to victims of assault. The ECJ held that France must
extend the privilege to the British national in order to avoid violating Article 12. See Cowan v.
Trésor Public, Case 186/87 [1989] ECR 195. See also Ministère Publique v. Heinrich Maria
Mutsch, Case 137/84, [1985] ECR 2681, where a German-speaking Luxembourg citizen was
arrested in Belgium and sought to have proceedings conducted in German as Belgian law allows
for German-speaking Belgian citizens. The Court drew on Article 39 and the free movement of
workers guaranteed by Regulation 1612/68 and ruled that Belgium could not deny Mutsch, as a
lawful resident worker in Belgium, the right to have proceedings conducted in German. It will be
observed that Bickel/Franz brings a nearly identical legal issue before the court, with the key
difference being the non-applicability of Article 39 and the freedom of movement for workers.
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In response to the second question, the ECJ found the discrimination to be in
violation of Article 12 non-discrimination principle. The Italian government, in its brief,
stressed that the scope of the right was to accommodate an insular minority, and its aim
was “to recognize the ethnic and cultural identity of persons belonging to the protected
minority.”164 Essentially, the Italian government staked its case on a group rights
justification. Its argument implicitly recognized the rights of Bickel and Franz qua
Community citizens, but contended that those rights were satisfied by the availability of
translators.165 The special right reserved for German-speaking residents did not apply to
nonresident German speakers simply because those persons were not part of the minority
group Italy aimed to protect.166 The Court instead focused on the reality that, on the
ground, and regardless of Italy’s motivation, German-speakers from Austria and
Germany were at a disadvantage compared to German-speaking Alto Adige residents.
The Court framed Article 100 as a protection of German-speakers in Alto Adige; the
Italian government claimed Article 100 protected only members of the Alto Adige
German-speaking minority.
In its decision, the Court reaffirmed that for a residence requirement to be
permissible under Community law, it must be based on objective criteria independent of

164

Bickel/Franz, at para. 21.

165

Id. at para. 25.

166

The same argument was put forward by the Italian government when it intervened in the
Mutsch case. See Palermo, supra note 2, at 304-05. See also Andrea Gattini, La non
discriminazione di cittadini comunitari nell’uso della lingua nel processo penale: il caso Bickel,
82 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 106, 107 (1999) (“Il principale argomento avanzato dal
Governo era che le norme nazionali adottate a tutela di una minoranza ufficialmente riconosciuta
potessero riguardare soltanto le persone appartenenti a detta minoranza e residenti nella zona in
cui fosse insediata.”).
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nationality as well as proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions.167
Furthermore, the Court repeated what it had stated in Groener: protecting a linguistic
minority is a legitimate objective per se. In this case, however, the Court found Article
100 of the Statute to be disproportionate since the rights could be extended with little
expense to cover German-speaking nationals of other Member States exercising their
right to freedom of movement.168 To summarize Advocate General Jacobs’ argument,
protecting a local linguistic minority is perfectly in harmony with the Treaty, but denying
visitors the right to use German was neither necessary nor appropriate to achieve that
goal.169 The Court agreed with the Advocate General, noting that “[i]t does not appear . .
. from the documents before the Court that that aim would be undermined if the rules in
issue were extended to cover German-speaking nationals of other Member States
exercising their right to freedom of movement.”170
For those waiting for the ECJ to adopt a hands-off approach regarding Member
State protections of minority languages in the aftermath of Groener, Bickel/Franz is a
staggering blow. For Austrian and German tourists who cross the frontier into Trentino

167

Bickel/Franz, at para. 27.

168

Id. at para. 29. Remember that the region already had a bilingual judiciary in place.

169

See id., Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, at para. 41. See also Barry Doherty, Bickel—Extending
the Boundaries of European Citizenship?, 8 IRISH J. EURO. L. 70, 77 (1999) (providing a cogent
summary of the A.G.’s arguments); Gattini, supra note 112, at 114 (discussing the A.G.’s opinion
in detail).
170

Bickel/Franz, at para. 29.
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Alto-Adige to enjoy the mountains (and all other EU citizens who are more comfortable
with German than Italian),171 the case is a welcome gesture.172
Notably absent from the ECJ opinion was consideration of the intentional
discriminatory effect of the law. Article 100 was included in the Statute to guarantee an
efficient and comprehensible trial for German-speaking residents; it was also intended to
accommodate an insular group of German-speakers living in Trentino-Alto Adige, not the
casual tourist whose links to the region are ephemeral. Throughout the opinion, the Court
never considers the real policy impetus behind Article 100: to protect the Germanspeaking minority group against outside influences (as provided by the Italian
Constitution) including (one could even say especially) other German-speakers.173 The
Court’s pronouncements on the per se validity of measures to protect linguistic minorities
ring hollow if the Court is disinclined to consider the very reason for their existence.
Bickel/Franz suggests that the ECJ is ready to intervene when Member State rules
designed to protect minority groups conflict with the exercise of individual Community
rights. In Bickel/Franz, the ECJ elides the real purpose of the provision in question, and
focuses exclusively on the effect on individuals. It may be objected that Article 100 deals
with criminal proceedings, and has little to do with preserving culture; the other side of

171

See Doherty, supra note 169, at 77 (“Behind this dense formulation is an unresolved
question: what does it mean to say that a person’s language is German? . . . the concept is
curiously undefined.”).
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Cf. Christoph J.M. Safferling, Case Comment on Bickel/Franz, 94 AM.J.INT’L L. 155,
159 (2000).
173

“Since the South Tyrol [Alto Adige] arrangement is so complex and based mainly on the
protection of a minority group against outside influences, particularly by making immigration to
South Tyrol difficult, it is not surprising that portions of this legislation conflict with EC law.”
Palermo, supra note 3, at 309.
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that coin is equally true: even if the right is extended to non-residents, no harm is done to
the Region’s interests and purposes. It is not clear whether extending the language right
in this case to all German speakers will attenuate the right’s force vis-à-vis the Germanspeaking Alto Adige denizens.174 However, when combined with the EU’s expansion
from a purely economic union into a social and political union bound together by
citizenship, the effects of the ECJ’s failure to countenance group rights as a sui generis
legal subject can hardly be underestimated. Indeed, we see the deleterious effects of such
an approach in the Angonese case, discussed next.
C.

THE ANGONESE175 CASE

In Angonese, the ECJ had occasion to reexamine the conflict in Groener between
non-discriminatory access to employment against the legitimacy of procedures for
gauging linguistic competence. In that case, the Court again fielded a preliminary
reference from a local Italian court in Trentino-Alto Adige. The case involved an
applicant to a position at a local private bank, the Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano.176
Angonese applied to enter into a competition for advertised positions at the bank. The
advertisement stipulated that candidates needed to possess a certificate—called the
patentino—as proof of their linguistic competence in both German and Italian. The bank
would not accept any other form of certification and the province of Bolzano, capital of
the Alto Adige, was the only authority that administered the patentino examination.
174

In this case, there was no evidence that extending the right to all German speakers would
increase court costs. See Bickel/Franz, para. 30.
175

176

See supra note 119.

I am summarizing the facts of the case from the reported opinion and a case comment.
See Robert Lane & Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Case Comment on Angonese, 37 COMMON MARKET L.
REV. 1237 (2000).
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When Angonese presented his application, complete with documentation from his
university training in Vienna that testified to his bilinguism, the bank denied him because
he did not possess the patentino. He then brought suit in the local Italian court in
Bolzano, alleging that the denial of his application violated Article 39 as well as
Regulation 1612/68. The local court referred the following question to the ECJ:
Is it compatible with Article [39](1), (2), and (3) of the EC Treaty . . . to
make the admission of candidates to a competition organized to fill posts
in a company governed by private law conditional on possession of the
official certificate attesting to knowledge of local languages issued
exclusively by a public authority of a Member State . . . ?177
The first part of the Court’s opinion established the horizontal direct effect of
Article 39 and Regulation 1612/68.178 Next, the Court proceeded to address the merits of
the requirement that applicants possess the patentino. The Court reasoned that since the
patentino was issued only in Bolzano, and the majority of Bolzano residents are Italian,
nationals of other Member States were at a disadvantage.179 The requirement could, as in
Bickel/Franz, be justified on the basis of proportionality.180 However, by barring
candidates from proving their ability by any other means, the bank’s action was

177

Angonese, at para. 15.

178

Id. at paras. 15-36. This portion of the ruling garnished much more attention from EU
scholars than the subsequent ruling on the merits of the requirement. Asserting the horizontal
direct effect of a fundamental freedom such as the freedom of movement for workers contained in
Article 39 is indeed a momentous development in EU law, and will undoubtedly undercut efforts
to protect minority languages by prohibiting even private parties from making certain distinctions
in favor of the minority languages.

179

180

Id. at para. 40.

Id. at para. 42. Again, the Court pronounced the legitimacy of the aim (in this case,
ascertaining linguistic competence), and then summarily rejected it.
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disproportionate and amounted to indirect discrimination in violation of Community
law.181
Angonese is further testament to the Court’s willingness to find a link to
Community law in an increasing variety of legal situations—in this case, a private
employment relationship. Again, the Court announces that the language-related
provision is per se legitimate, but then summarily strikes it down. Relying on a dictum
from Groener, the Court ruled that “the principle of non-discrimination precludes any
requirement that the linguistic knowledge in question must have been acquired within the
national territory.”182 In Angonese, the Court treats the patentino requirement as though
its sole aim was to ascertain individual applicants’ knowledge of German. Again, the
Court’s approach is one of institutional blindness, as if to say “we rule on individual
Community rights, and have no competence to consider the purposes of domestic
language policy.”
The Court sees the aim of the requirement in different terms than the employer
and the Bolzano minority. The focus is on the Community rights of individuals that
speak the minority language, and not the flourishing of the minority language group
itself. It is almost certain that the bank had adopted a policy requiring the patentino in
part because it could thus encourage employment among local Bolzano residents, and
perhaps foster banking relationships with the local bilingual population.183 In this respect

181

Id. at paras. 45-46.

182

Id. at para. 43.

183

In this context, it is important to remember that no one questioned Angonese’s
knowledge of German. After all, he presented degrees he received at the University of Vienna, as
well as proof Id. at para. 8.
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the patentino requirement was analogous to the Irish requirement at issue in Groener: it
served an immediate functional purpose, but also had a collateral effect of contributing to
the flourishing of the minority group. In the same respect Angonese is different than
Bickel/Franz. The language right provided to criminal defendants did not reverberate
collaterally to the benefit of the German-speaking community. However, Angonese is
evidence of the dangers of extending the Bickel/Franz interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle to an increasing array of bona fide group rights aimed at
contributing to the cultural life of minority language groups.
It may be said that in applying Community law to situations as in Angonese, the
ECJ is taking “free movement” and “non-discrimination” to their logical conclusion.
Nevertheless, such a rigid formalist approach is rarely required of judicial institutions,
and one must wonder how prudent such an approach is in the context of language.184
Language is always a politically sensitive issue because it is so intimately connected with
the preservation of regional and cultural identity. To the extent the ECJ’s current
approach ignores the sui generis nature of group rights, it glosses over this cultural and
political sensitivity. The broad intepretation of European citizenship flowing from
Martinez Sala, Trojani, and Directive 2004/38 means that EU citizens will be able to
claim community rights in an increasing range of scenarios. And as the scope of
Community law widens, the space for group rights to operate shrinks correspondingly.
Such a dynamic is, to put it lightly, inadequate.
D.

BEYOND ARTICLE 12: MOVING TOWARDS A NEW VOCABULARY OF SUI GENERIS
GROUP RIGHTS

184

See Lane & Shuibhne, supra note 176, at 1247.

21-Aug-06]

E.U. APPROACH TO MINORITY LANGUAGES

57

The inadequacy results from the failure of EU law to conceive of minority
language groups as proper subjects of EU law. The proportionality test will almost
always result in the striking down of Member State’s group protections because the
Member States’ interests are defined narrowly. Member States have thus signed away
most of their sovereign rights to provide any group protection that conflicts—even
indirectly—with Community Law. Member States have a reduced incentive to address
minority concerns at the group level, since such measures are bound to conflict with the
freedom of movement of persons and workers, as well as the principle of nondiscrimination. The irony is that just as the EU is abandoning its exclusive economic
telos, and developing into a social and political union, equal footing for minority
languages may very well be in jeopardy.
I believe an alternate approach is available in this context. When Member States
grant special group rights to minority language groups, they are not violating the nondiscrimination principle; instead, they are implicitly recognizing the inadequacy of the
absolutist interpretation of such a principle. Minority groups merit exceptional treatment
because their situation is exceptional (or sui generis, to again borrow Segesvary’s
formulation). Insofar as EU law fails to recognize this, the minority language groups are
the first casualty. Stated differently, the current state of EU law lacks a sufficient
vocabulary to treat minority language groups as legally protectable subjects.
A comparison to U.S. law may be of value at this juncture. Compare the race
segregation of schoolchildren in Brown v. Board of Education185 to the discrimination at
issue in, e.g., Angonese. In some respects, the distinctions drawn are similar: individuals
pertaining to certain groups are afforded different treatment based on the mere fact of
185

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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their belonging to a group. Only at the most abstract level, however, does the analogy
hold. A closer examination of the distinction reveals an important difference. In the case
of Brown, the distinction drawn bore no relation to the aim sought. At some point in the
American South, it may have been morally legitimate to maintain that separate schooling
was necessary for the development of the schoolchildren. At that time, then, race was
therefore inextricably intertwined with the education system. But by the 1950s the
distinction had become sheer arbitrariness. It no longer was morally or empirically
permissible to maintain that segregating the races aided in the education of children.
Stripped of the logical connection to the education system, the distinction was nothing
more than a pretextual method of enforcing an extant social order.
However, in the case of Angonese, the distinction drawn (impliedly, between
Bolzano-resident German-speakers and other German-speakers) bore an identifiable
relation to the aim of contributing to the flourishing of the local community. The policy
in Angonese, then, was not a pretextual and protectionist attempt to favor entrenched
economic interests. It was not, in short, the sort of distinction that the EU has fought
against so successfully over the years. Unlike the segregationist motive in Brown, the
state interest in preserving national culture and languages is not immoral or undesirable;
indeed, it is subject to continual affirmations to the contrary, at both the EU level (indeed,
by the ECJ itself) and the Member State level.
Admittedly, the distinction will not always be so clear as between Brown and
Angonese, but the ECJ has the institutional expertise and experience of drawing such
distinctions. Throughout its history, the ECJ has exhibited boldness and shrewdness in
smoking out illegitimate protectionist motives disguised as legitimate exercises of
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Member State power. The fundamental problem is that the ECJ cannot gauge the
tightness of the connection between a distinction and an aim if it does not recognize the
aim for what it truly is. Instead of framing the interest as an accommodation for minority
language speakers, the ECJ should consider the well-being of the community of speakers
as a sui generis and irreducible subject of European law.
The ease with which the ECJ formally endorses the legitimacy of protecting
minority languages renders this inadequacy all the more complicated. Policymakers and
litigants do not need to convince the ECJ of the importance of linguistic diversity; from
Groener to Angonese, the ECJ has expressly recognized the importance of the interest.
Instead, they need to develop a new vocabulary altogether. To start with, the ECJ should
recognize that laws protecting a group of minority language speakers are not meant
purely to maintain the number of individuals who are familiar with, or speak, that
language. If that were true, then it would be enough to assert, as the ECJ has often done,
that language proficiency requirements are a legitimate objective to pursue. Oftentimes,
such laws are intended to vest rights only in members of that community to the exclusion
of non-members.
Of course, not all minority-protective domestic laws are equally at risk of being
struck down under the current framework. For example, the quasi-federal system of the
Spanish autonomous communities in itself stands little chance of violating the EC Treaty.
Similarly, the simple constitutional or codified recognition of multiple official languages
will certainly not raise eyebrows in Brussels. These protections (especially the latter) are,
however, largely symbolic. While the symbolic order of a language group is constitutive
of that group, and reinforces its sense of identity, a language’s long-term survival
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depends on its ability to remain relevant in the lives of its speakers not merely
symbolically. In this context, it is not so much the creation of the Catalonian
Generalitat186 that matters as how the Generalitat contributes to the flourishing of the
Catalonian community—and, by extension, their language. However, laws that condition
grant substantive rights to individuals by virtue of their membership in a linguistic
community are most at risk, and are almost certain to provoke litigation in the European
courts.187 As such, even if the procedural protections discussed supra do not, in
themselves, appear to be on a collision course with the EC Treaty, their effectiveness may
be undermined by tying the hands of the local lawmakers who are unable to provide
substantive and affirmative protections for local languages.
This article has been primarily concerned with laws impeding the free movement
of workers and EU citizens, and it is true that any domestic laws that place non-members
at a disadvantage vis-à-vis linguistic community members are at most risk. However, it
is not difficult to conceive of minority-protective laws that counteract the free movement
of services or capital either. To take a current example, the newly amended Statute of
Autonomy for Catalonia creates a right for individual Catalonians to be served in
Catalán.188 If a French national perceives a good business opportunity in Catalonia, but
speaks no Catalán and anticipates serving a primarily Spanish client base, can that French
businessman obtain redress in the ECJ if a barrage of complaints file in from potential
Catalán consumers complaining of his lack of respect for their language rights? Or what

186

See supra note 30.
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Whether such substantive rights are dispensed from the central government or sub-state
legislative entities is of no moment.
188

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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result where an Austrian broadcasting company looking to purchase a local radio station
in Trentino-Alto Adige to expand its Italian coverage decides the transaction is no longer
favorable if it must broadcast in German too on account of regional or even central
government regulations mandating a certain percentage of German broadcasting? Rather
than declaring a moratorium on such laws, it makes more sense to charge the ECJ with an
honest inquiry into the motives of the Member State (or regional) legislatures
promulgating the laws.
V.

CONCLUSIONS
Member States may expect more group protective measures to be invalidated by

the ECJ if there is any link, even a tenuous link, to the EC Treaty. What would follow
could be a race to the bottom, with the least protective Member States being vindicated
because their protections extended to minority groups are so paltry as to not conflict with
the Treaty.
There is considerable potential for development in the interaction of Community
law and Member State law with respect to minority language rights. After Bickel/Franz,
Angonese, and Martinez Sala, the time is ripe for addressing these problems. What is
necessary is a recognition of minority language groups as subjects of sui generis group
rights, as discussed supra in Part III.A. Assuming the ECJ does not alter its course sua
sponte, at least three strategies are possible. First, the Member States could explicitly
grant competence to the EU to address minority language concerns. In this context,
Article 151 represents a tentative, though incomplete, step in the right direction. A truly
effective competence must include an explicit mention of minority rights, and provide a
means of implementation that does not require unanimity. The chief difficulty with such
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an approach is that it displaces the political discussions about minority rights away from
the Member States to Brussels without tempering the general applicability of Article 12’s
non-discrimination norm.189 As we have seen, the Member States and their sub-state
units have demonstrated more enthusiasm and experience in addressing the minority
language concerns.
Second, Member States could temper the rigor with which the ECJ interprets the
consequences of the individual rights flowing from the four freedoms and beyond. This
solution too would require Treaty modification. Perhaps a compromise similar to Article
5’s subsidiarity principle could be possible;190 the ECJ would simply look the other way
when some Member State measures conflict with an EU provision such as the nondiscrimination norm. Articles I-2 and I-3(3) of the Constitution are promising proposals
in this regard, but the experience from Article 151 should caution against an exaggerated
optimism. More explicit language is likely needed in order for the ECJ to approve of
group-based preferences that conflict with core EU principles enshrined in the Treaties.
Third, Member States could include a directly-effective affirmative action treaty
provision permitting action by Member States to ensure substantive equality for minority
groups, linguistic or otherwise.191 Substantive equality, in this instance, would apply on a
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For a discussion of the difficulties inhering in selecting a Community-level language policy, see
Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Does the Draft Constitution Contain a Language Policy? (Feb. 2004) at 6, available
at http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/pdf/simpshuibhne.pdf#search=%22%22does%20the%20draft%20
EU%20 constitution%20contain%20a%20language%20policy%3F%22%22 (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
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See EC Treaty, art. 5.

Cf. EC Treaty, art. 141. Article 141(4) provides that “[w]ith a view to ensuring full
equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment
shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific
advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity
or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.”
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group basis, with minorities having equal opportunities to witness the flourishing of their
languages.
Whatever the action is, the EU should act soon. The funded projects to help
preserve minority languages, the soft law pronouncements, and the changing mood about
European integration all testify to the anxiety in the EU that somehow, something must
be done to address this tension between individual rights and minority group rights.
Given the current stalled state of the integration discourse in light of the 2005 vetoes, it
may be a particularly propitious moment to move ahead. Of course, the lack of adequate
protection for minority language rights itself did not hold up the ratification of the EU
Constitution; however, a decisive step to address this and similar problems could provide
some momentum in the effort to mute the anti-integrationist discourse of Europe as the
grand destroyer of cultural particularities.

